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Abstract 
This study discusses how different agents shape institutional change in Tajikistan, and 
ultimately how this affects the process of decentralization within pasture management 
institutions. The purpose of this thesis is to explore how decentralization takes place 
in the context of institutional change, and to increase our understanding of the 
potential barriers to the effective decentralization of natural resources. Mahoney and 
Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change is used to determine which agents 
drive institutional change, and in turn, what type of change is produced as a result. 
The analysis is based on field notes from conferences uniting main stakeholders in 
pasture governance, interviews with key informants and livestock owners and a desk 
review of pasture management legislation. The results reveal that although there are 
agents actively seeking to create change, notably international organizations and parts 
of the government, there are also agents that seek ways to contradict it. A 
combination of strong veto power and a high level of discretion strengthens agents 
seeking to preserve the status quo. These factors are exacerbated by a high level of 
institutional ambiguity. Ultimately, the political and institutional environment favours 
agents exploiting pasture management institutions for personal gain, making the 
successful decentralization of pasture resources in Tajikistan unlikely.  
 
Key words: institutional change, Tajikistan, pastures, decentralization, natural 
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Definitions  
Dekhan farms 
Farm laborers’ cooperatives, created as a means of transitioning away from the 
collective and state farms of the Soviet era (Rowe, 2010:191). In the Tajik Legal 
Code ‘On Dekhan (Private) Farms’ they are described as citizen-run cooperatives, 
subject to government oversight (Ibid.).  
 
Hukumat 
The term means supremacy, executive power and government, and usually refers to a 
form of government administration (Abdullaev & Akbarzaheh, 2010:160). 
 
Jamoat 
A local, self-governing group that comprises of a varying number of villages 
(Abdullaev & Akbarzaheh, 2010:47). 
 
Pastures 
Pastures are defined as “land with low-growing vegetation cover used for grazing of 
livestock”. Vegetation growth on pastures can include grasses, legumes, forbs like 
clover and milkweed, shrubs or a mixture (Sedik, 2009:193). Because there is no clear 
distinction between rangelands and pastures in Tajikistan, the term “pasture” is also 
used to refer to rangelands.  
 
Rangelands 
Rangelands are characterized in two ways – as a type of land, and as a type of land 
use (Squires, 2011:n.p.). For the purpose of this thesis rangelands are defined as 
“uncultivated land that will provide the necessities of life for grazing and browsing 
animals and the herder families that depend on them” (Ibid.). Rangelands are the main 
source of forage, fuelwood, and wildlife for pastoral and agropastoral communities, 
and include deserts, forests, natural grasslands and shrublands (Ibid.). 
 
Saharob 
A plot of land, usually pastureland, under the responsibility of village authorities. It is 
a form of village commons which all residents in a village may use equally e.g. for 
grazing. The quantity of land and specific rules of use can vary from village to village 
(Key informant 2).  
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1. Introduction 
 
Throughout the world, governments are trying to decentralize the management of 
natural resources (Ribot et al. 2006, Meynen & Doornbos, 2004, Larson & Ribot, 
2004). Yet, throughout the world, they are failing (Ibid.). Tajikistan is one of many 
developing countries where institutional change is far from a straightforward process, 
with a multitude of different agents affecting the decentralization process. This thesis 
explores this phenomenon in relation to pasture management.  
 
Pastures in Tajikistan are facing tremendous challenges. Throughout Tajikistan, 
livestock are the main source of income for rural populations (Robinson & Whitton, 
2010; Avazov, 2013:11), and are described by academics as the “most important farm 
resource after land and water” (Lerman, 2012:176-177). As a landlocked country with 
few natural resources and over 40% of the population living below the poverty line, 
Tajikistan is heavily dependent on agriculture, and the widespread degradation of 
pastures is a major obstacle for Tajikistan’s future economic development. 
Constituting over 75% of the nation’s scarce arable land, pastures are a key 
component of the rural economy (Ibid.). However, in the past decades a combination 
of incomplete land reform, rapidly increasing animal populations and drastic 
decreases in the amount and quality of feed has led to the severe degradation of 
pastures and agricultural land. This, in turn, is not only environmentally 
unsustainable, but has also led to low animal productivity throughout the country. As 
households increase the size of their livestock herds in an effort to increase their 
income, they are locked in a cycle of land overuse and poverty (Sedik, 2010). Pasture 
degradation jeopardizes millions of rural livelihoods, and could potentially exacerbate 
the risk of instability and conflict (Squires, 2012:x). 
 
Amid claims that government policies have consistently “ignored efficient pasture 
management, contributing to unsustainable use and degradation of pastures” (Lerman, 
2012:178), the government of Tajikistan is attempting to improve pasture 
management institutions by implementing more decentralized forms of natural 
resource governance (United Nations Country Team, 2009: 23; Novovic, 2011). 
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Decentralization, defined as “the transfer of power from the central government to 
actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial 
hierarchy” (Larson & Ribot, 2004:3; UNDP, 1999) has been widely acclaimed as a 
key component of good governance and development (White, 2011; Azfar et al., 
2001:5-6). Political decentralization that involves a genuine transfer of power to 
actors that are downwardly accountable is said to increase accountability, reduce 
corruption and bring local knowledge into the decision-making process, among many 
other benefits (Azfar et al. 2001:5-6; Ribot et al. 2006:1865; White, 2011).  
This form of institutional change has come to be implemented at a global scale. In 
recent years, reforms for decentralizing the governance of resources have been 
implemented in institutions throughout the world, opening for new forms of local and 
non-state management of resources in the hopes of creating more sustainable and 
equitable forms of natural resource management with a greater degree of local 
participation (Meynen & Doornbos, 2004:235-236). In fact, Ribot et al argue that “[i]f 
one were to choose a single word to characterize the nature of institutional changes 
that governments have instituted across many different sectors, that word would likely 
be ‘decentralization’” (2006:1864).  
Nonetheless, for Tajikistan decentralizing has not been as simple as it seems. The 
approach to agricultural reform on behalf of Tajik government “has been gradual and 
limited” (Lerman & Sedik, 2008:25), and the transition was complicated by the 
eruption of the violent civil war upon independence from the Soviet Union 
(Makhmadshoev et al., 2015:5). The war resulted in the almost complete destruction 
of economic infrastructure, and a fragile government with scarce resources to invest 
in the rebuilding of institutions and industry (Collins, 2003:284-285; Rowe, 
2010:158).  Incomplete land reform, land tenure issues and over-centralization remain 
some of the main challenges to the pasture management sector and rural development 
in Tajikistan today (World Bank, 2012:17; United Nations Country Team, 2009:17). 
The issue is further complicated by a lack of transparency and the concentration of 
power and resources in the hands of a few elites, as different actors seek to influence 
this process of institutional change (De Martino, 2004:8). 
Tajikistan is one of many post-Soviet republics that continue to face difficulties in 
implementing decentralization reforms while facing the institutional and 
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environmental legacy of past Soviet systems. In spite of overwhelming theoretical 
evidence of the advantages of decentralized natural resource governance regimes, 
several studies have found that decentralization within natural resource governance is 
happening slowly, if at all (Ribot et al., 2006; Larson & Ribot, 2004). Some studies 
have found evidence that decentralization can strengthen local elites, increasing the 
risk of elite capture (Andersson, 2002; Pacheco, 2007). Decentralization outcomes 
have been very mixed even among the cases claimed to be most successful and the 
actual outcome of decentralization policies to a large extent depends on the 
institutional environment  (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008; Azfar et al., 2001; Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 1998). The varied outcomes of decentralized resource regimes points to 
a gap in existing research and highlights the need for an increased understanding of 
how decentralized resource regimes come into existence, and how they are 
implemented within a general context of institutional change.  Tajikistan is relevant to 
this study as an exemplifying case – it is by no means unique or extreme case, but 
rather provides a suitable backdrop for the study of how natural resource governance 
institutions develop. 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
This thesis aims to fill the gap in the research by exploring the factors that affect 
institutional change, and by extension natural resource governance, in the context of 
decentralization. The purpose of this thesis is to gain insight into how decentralization 
processes are affected by the general process of institutional change, and to gain a 
deeper understanding of the potential barriers for effective decentralization of natural 
resource management. Therefore, this thesis attempts to answer the question: 
 
How are different agents shaping institutional change in Tajikistan, and how does this 
affect the decentralization process within pasture management institutions? 
 
The thesis takes the form of a qualitative case study. The process of institutional 
change in the pasture sector in Tajikistan is examined using the theory of gradual 
institutional change proposed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010). The theory seeks to 
explain how and why institutional change occurs by examining institutional agents 
and how they negotiate institutional ambiguities related to the enforcement and 
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implementation of rules. I had the unique opportunity to observe how these 
ambiguities were negotiated in practice over the course of two conferences, which 
united a range of different stakeholders involved in the drafting and implementation 
of pasture management legislation. As such, the thesis is based on field observations 
from the conferences, interviews with key informants and livestock owners and a desk 
review of relevant documents. In applying this framework to the case of pasture 
management institutions in Tajikistan, I hope to make both a theoretical and empirical 
contribution to this under researched area of the world, while also contributing to a 
deeper understanding of how the relationship between the institutional environment 
and the efficacy of decentralization policies.  The results of this research are not only 
relevant for the future development in Tajikistan, but can also contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the factors affecting policy implementation, particularly in the 
contexts of transition economies and natural resource governance.  
 
1.2 Disposition 
This study is structured as follows. Chapter two contains a literature review of 
existing research about the relationship between institutions and natural resource 
governance. In chapter three institutions are defined and the theoretical framework is 
presented. This is followed by chapter four, in which the methodology is described, 
and chapter five, which contains the analysis. The sixth and final chapter consists of 
concluding remarks.  
2. Literature Review  
In this thesis, the process of institutional change is studied through the lens of 
decentralization of natural resource management institutions. In section 2.1 the 
relationship between institutions and natural resource governance is presented in the 
context of previous research. This is followed by a short overview of previous 
research about natural resource governance specifically in Tajikistan in section 2.2.  
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2.1 Institutions and Natural Resource Governance  
The role of institutional arrangements in managing natural resources can in many 
ways be traced back to Hardin’s famous analogy “The Tragedy of the Commons”. 
Hardin advocated for the advantages of state and private property institutions over 
communal means of resource management, warning about the pitfalls of shared 
management of resources (Hardin, 1968; Cole et al., 2014). Since then, the benefits 
and disadvantages of private, state and community-based resource management 
systems have been extensively debated (Meynen & Doornbos, 2004:237). Until the 
1980s, research about natural resource governance was often based on the assumption 
that self-organization among resource users was impossible, thus leading to 
recommendations of government or private ownership based on theorists like Hardin 
(1968) and Gordon (1954) (Cox et al., 2010:1). However, in following decades the 
imposition of private ownership regimes was increasingly questioned, and the 
perception of natural resources as a common, or collective, good emerged, along with 
the understanding that Hardin’s tragedy can be avoided through collective action 
(Araral, 2014:12).  
 
Much of the research within this field has been devoted to understanding the 
conditions and institutional designs that lead to the successful collective management 
of natural resources. In her renowned work “Governing the Commons” (1990), 
Ostrom identifies several design principles that characterize enduring natural resource 
governing systems. These include, but are not limited to, clearly defined boundaries, 
the ability of resource users to tailor rules to local circumstances, the need for 
monitoring and sanctions, and the overall importance of resource user participation in 
effective governance (1990:100-102). Ostrom’s findings were of pivotal importance, 
and have served as the departure point for several ensuing studies about the benefits 
of local resource governance systems. Authors seeking to further develop this field, 
have called attention to the social relationships and structures that affect resource 
governance (Sick 2008), the importance of community structures (Tang, 1996), and 
how the motivations of individual resource users shape natural resource use (Baur et 
al 2014). “Making resource protectors out of potential resource destroyers” (McKean, 
1996:227) and the efficacy of institutions designed and enforced by the resource users 
themselves has been increasingly recognized as the “best” means of governing natural 
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resources, and is supported by a vast body of research (e.g. Ostrom, 2007; Morrow 
and Hull, 1996; De Moor, Shaw-Taylor and Warde, 2002). 
 
Yet, in spite of the theoretical advantages of decentralizing natural resource 
governance, research also shows that the practical implementation of decentralized 
governance schemes is far from straight forward. In an extensive review of case 
studies representing some of the most successful examples of decentralization of 
natural resource governance, Larsson and Ribot conclude that “the democratic 
decentralization of natural resource management is barely happening”, and that the 
power of local institutions is frequently curtailed or limited by central governments 
(Larson & Ribot 2004:5, emphasis in original). This is echoed by Manor (2004) who 
studies the implementation of user committees, a form of decentralized resource 
management that has become increasingly popular throughout the world. Manor finds 
that user committees are often used by governments to impose controls, and that they 
have a negative impact on decentralization reforms. Other studies emphasize that in 
some cases decentralization even appears to have strengthened local elites (Andersson 
& Ostrom, 2008:72), and that local governance regimes “only rarely […] provide 
evidence for the emergence of downwardly accountable local decision makers who 
are able to effectively exercise their powers” (Ribot et al, 2006: 1867). 
 
The challenges inherent to decentralization have led to discussions about the need to 
further research the impact of different agents and processes of institutional change on 
natural resource management (Sick 2008:97; Meynen & Doornbos 2004:240; 
Andersson & Ostrom 2008:73). In a case study of the forestry sectors in Bolivia, Peru 
and Guatemala, Andersson and Ostrom find that “the key to effective governance 
arrangements lies in the relationships among actors who have a stake in the 
governance of the resource” (2008:88). They highlight the need for a deeper 
understanding of how relationships among multiple, overlapping authorities at 
different management levels shape resource governance, arguing that there is an 
absence of empirical studies of multi-level dynamics in this field. Meynen and 
Doornbos (2004) come to a similar conclusion, but place special emphasis on the role 
of international actors. They conclude that international pressures to decentralize can 
lead to policy inconsistencies and hinder effective decentralization, especially in weak 
states without a large resource base. The varied outcomes of decentralized resource 
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regimes suggests that there is a need for more research that takes the influence of a 
multitude of institutional agents into account, while also considering a broader 
institutional context.  
2.2. Natural Resource Governance in Tajikistan 
The literature in this field relating to specifically to Tajikistan is scarce, however, 
there are a few noteworthy contributions. In his study of land reform in Tajikistan 
after independence from the Soviet Union, Rowe (2010) shows that many elements of 
the Soviet system remain unchanged, partly because privatization of agricultural 
resources could lead to a decrease in income for rural elites. Sehring (2007) also 
makes an interesting contribution in a comparative case study of water governance in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the prevalence of informal rules in Water User 
Associations (WUAs) in the two countries.  
 
Nonetheless, the study of natural resource management institutions in Central Asia 
and particularly in a post-Soviet institutional context remains a narrow field. The 
research conditions in Tajikistan have been seen as unfavorable during the past few 
decades, with many researchers perceiving it as an unstable location with ongoing 
violence, leading to the country in general being under researched (Rowe, 2010:190). 
Authors also note that there is a “conspicuous lack of evidence-based policy dialogue 
with the government on the effectiveness of land and agricultural policies in 
Tajikistan”, and that scientific evaluations of policies and reforms are lacking 
(Lerman & Sedik, 2008:1). Furthermore, considering the extremely mountainous 
terrain of the country, there is a need for “special emphasis” on the proper 
management and “strong, high-quality governance” of pasture resources to optimize 
agriculture while minimizing erosion (Lerman & Sedik, 2008:9). Considering the 
importance of pastures to rural livelihood strategies in Tajikistan, this research fills a 
highly relevant gap in the in-depth knowledge of this remote and difficult to access 
country.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to analyze institutional change within pasture management institutions 
Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory of gradual institutional change is applied. In the 
first section of this chapter institutions are discussed and defined. The second section 
describes the theoretical underpinnings to institutional change upon which this study 
rests. This is followed by a description of Mahoney and Thelen’s framework of 
gradual institutional change and its components, including mechanisms of change, 
types of change and agents of change.    
3.1 Institutions as Instruments of Power 
For the purpose of this thesis, institutions are defined as “the humanly devised 
constraints imposed on human interaction”, consisting of formal and informal rules 
and their enforcement characteristics, in line with the definition proposed by North 
(1993:97). In other words, institutions can be understood as systems of established 
rules that shape and define human interactions (Hodgson, 2006:2). Formal rules 
include, for instance, laws, constitutions and property rights, while informal rules can 
include codes of conduct, traditions, or taboos (North, 1993:97). Within the scope of 
this thesis, the main institutions of interest are pasture management institutions, which 
are understood as the collections of formal and informal rules governing the use and 
management of pastures in Tajikistan at national and local levels. Additionally, a key 
aspect of this approach is the view of institutions as distributional instruments rather 
than coordinating devices (Mahoney, 2010:15). As such, institutions are not neutral 
structures, but in fact “are settlements born from struggle and bargaining. They reflect 
the resources and power of those who made them, and in turn, affect the distribution 
of resources and power in society” (Campbell, 2004:1).  
3.2 Understanding Institutional Change 
The theoretical approach used throughout this thesis emerges from the field of 
historical institutionalism. Unlike sociological and rational choice perspectives on 
institutions, historical institutionalists emphasize power asymmetries and historical 
legacies as factors shaping institutions (Béland, 2007:21). Institutions are seen as 
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“enduring legacies of political struggles”, and there is emphasis on political and 
institutional development as a process (Thelen, 1999:388). Thelen emphasizes the 
importance of examining institutions as dynamic structures that continually produce 
unintended results as “different, ongoing processes interact” (Idem.:383-384). 
Therefore, the point of focus for this thesis is not institutional outcomes that result 
from institutional change, but the process of institutional change itself. The emphasis 
on process over outcome is a highly relevant approach for this study, considering that 
the decentralization of existing institutions and the creation of new institutions in 
Tajikistan are very much ongoing. While it is not possible to evaluate the result of 
these changes yet, a critical examination of how institutional change occurs and the 
role different agents within this process is a highly relevant subject, considering that it 
is likely to influence the development of natural resource governance in Tajikistan in 
the future. 
 
Defining institutions as power-laden actors impacts how institutional change is 
conceptualized. Institutional theory has been criticized for failing to adequately 
explain why and how institutions change over time during periods of relative stability 
(Dacin et al., 2002: 45; Béland, 2007:22-23). Much of the literature in this field is 
dedicated to explaining the permanence of institutions over time, or describes 
institutional change as a consequence external shocks or shifts for instance in 
response to shifting power balances or at “critical junctures”, with institutions 
frequently being understood as self-sustaining or self-reinforcing (Powell, 1991:197, 
Jepperson, 1991:145). Recognizing that power dynamics are inherent to most 
institutions opens for the possibility of institutions changing not only in response to 
external shocks, but as a response to pressures and tensions from within (Béland, 
2007). As a result, institutional permanence or stability cannot simply be seen as a 
constant variable, independent of power struggles. Rather, the stability of institutions 
over time to some extent depends on the effort and mobilization of resources on 
behalf of actors actively seeking to maintain the institution (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2010:9). Similarly, agents disadvantaged by the institutional current arrangements 
may instigate change because it benefits them (Idem.:22).  
 
In recent years, efforts have been made to address this critique, and a more 
evolutionary approach to institutional change has emerged (Béland 2007:21, Streeck 
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and Thelen, 2005; Hacker, 2004, Tridico, 2011:119). However, empirical evidence 
remains limited, and existing frameworks have been criticized for not adequately 
explaining why certain types of change take place rather than others, or what 
mechanisms affect the direction of change (Béland 2007:23).  In order to fill the gaps 
identified in current institutionalist research, Mahoney and Thelen develop a theory 
for gradual institutional change (2010:7). 
3.3 A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change 
Drawing on previous studies of evolutionary change, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) 
propose a framework that seeks to not just categorize the type of institutional change 
taking place, but also to explain how the change is related to the political and 
institutional environment. The authors argue that different types of agents can exist 
within institutions, with each type of agent attempting to produce a certain type of 
change. The agents that emerge as dominant and the type of institutional change that 
is created depend on the political context and the characteristics of the institution, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. In sum, the model provides a means of understanding how 
different political and institutional contexts influence the type of change-agent that 
emerges, which, in turn, influences the type of institutional change taking place. The 
elements of the model are further discussed in the upcoming sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author, adapted from Mahoney & Thelen 2010:15. 
Mechanisms of Change 
The role of the political and institutional context in shaping the change that takes 
place within institutions is closely linked to two mechanisms of change, namely 
compliance and institutional ambiguity. Rather than taking the enforcement of and 
Characteristics of 
Institution 
Type of 
Dominant 
Change Agent 
Type of 
Institutional 
Change 
Characteristics of 
Political Context 
Figure 1. Framework Explaining Modes of Institutional Change 
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compliance with institutional rules for granted, Mahoney and Thelen argue that the 
need to enforce institutions is what makes change possible. The rules governing 
institutions can be both formal and informal, and expectations guiding institutional 
enforcement are often ambiguous and subject to interpretation (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2010:11). Furthermore, institutions are hierarchical structures, and the practical 
enforcement and implementation of rules often falls into the hands of different actors 
than those who designed the rules (Idem:13). In order to implement and enforce 
institutions, actors need to negotiate these ambiguities with each other, with some 
elements of rule-enforcement being left up to individual judgment. This creates space 
for institutional change, where actors can influence how institutions work by for 
instance choosing to enforce existing rules to varying extents, different interpretations 
of rules, or applying of old rules in new contexts (Idem:11-13). In other words, the 
authors hypothesize that institutional change is more likely to occur in environments 
characterized by high degrees of institutional ambiguity, where uncertainty over 
interpretation, enforcement affects compliance with existing rules. This creates 
openings where actors seeking to change institutions have the opportunity to influence 
institutional processes and drive change.  
 
The characteristics of the political and institutional context affect the extent to which 
the opportunities for institutional change exist. The authors define the political 
context by the extent to which actors defending the status quo are able to exercise 
veto power, while the institutional context is defined by the level of discretion agents 
have in interpreting and enforcing rules (2010:18). If the agents resisting change have 
access to means of blocking change, whether formally or informally, this is a form of 
veto power, which makes it more difficult for agents seeking change to mobilize 
resources and influence rules. At the same time, a high level of discretion in enforcing 
the rules also influences the capacities of agents to create change, and is related to the 
previously discussed issue of compliance. If there is a low level of discretion in 
implementing rules, change is less likely, since it makes it more difficult to apply a 
different interpretation of compliance in practice. In other words, the extent to which 
actors resisting change can exercise veto power, and the level of discretion when 
interpreting and enforcing institutional rules affects the type of change taking place. 
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Types of Change 
Drawing from previous work by Streeck and Thelen (2005) and Hacker (2004), 
Mahoney and Thelen identify four types of institutional change and how they take 
place, namely displacement, layering, conversion and drift. Displacement refers to the 
type of change that occurs when old rules are replaced with new rules. This can occur 
in the form of abrupt, radical shifts, for instance if a revolution breaks down existing 
rules and institutions. However, it is worth noting that displacement is not necessarily 
always fast. New institutions can also emerge alongside existing old institutions, and 
directly challenge them over a period of time, which can be a slow, lengthy process. 
An example of this is the emergence of market-oriented institutions in China, where 
the old system must contend with new ones (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:16). 
 
The second type of change is layering. Layering occurs when new rules are added 
onto an existing institutional framework. This includes amendments or revisions to 
existing rules. Although layering may only result in small changes in the short term, 
small changes can accumulate in the long run. Actors that disagree with current 
institutional rules but lack the capacity to overtly challenge them may seek to change 
institutions by layering, while defenders of the status quo may be able to prevent the 
removal of old rules, they may not be able to prevent the addition of new rules to the 
same extent.  
 
Drift, the third type of change, occurs when institutional rules formally remain the 
same, but external circumstances change the impact of the rules. In other words, if the 
environment in which the rules are applied changes drastically, neglecting to adjust 
the rules can change the impact that the institution has on its environment.  
 
Finally, conversion occurs when institutional rules remain the same, but their impact 
is changed because they are interpreted and enforced in new ways. It is worth 
emphasizing that this type of change is not the unintended result of failing to adjust 
rules to new external circumstances, as can be the case in drift, but rather an 
intentional exploitation of ambiguities within rules and institutions to change their 
meaning.  
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Agents of Change 
Mahoney and Thelen present four different types of change agents that can drive 
institutional change. These are insurrectionaries, symbionts, subversives and 
opportunists. The agents are characterized based on two basic factors – whether they 
seek to preserve existing institutional rules, and whether they abide by existing 
institutional rules. The first actor type, insurrectionaries, actively seeks to eliminate 
existing rules and institutions, and openly opposes them. Insurrectionaries reject the 
status quo, and when they succeed it can lead to abrupt change, where old rules and 
status quo are replaced by “radically new rules” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:24). As a 
result, insurrectionaries are frequently associated with displacement. 
 
Symbionts, on the other hand, “rely (and thrive) on institutions that are not of their 
own making” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:24). These actors can fall into two 
categories, parasitic and mutualistic. Parasitic actors exploit weaknesses in the 
institutions for personal gain, in spite of the fact that they depend on the general 
functioning of the institution for survival. Mutualistic actors also rely on the general 
functioning of the institutions, and also use ambiguities and weaknesses to advance 
their own personal interests. Unlike parasitic actors however, mutualistic actors 
manipulate the rules in ways that strengthen the institution and its purpose.  Parasitic 
actors are generally associated with drift, while mutualistic actors are associated with 
an increased robustness of the institutions rather than a type of change. 
  
The third category type refers to subversives. Subversives do not agree with the 
institutional status quo, and seek to change it. However, unlike the insurrectionaries, 
they do not try to change it overtly. Instead they seek change while simultaneously 
complying with the rules and following institutional expectations, and in doing so in a 
sense “disguise the extent of their preference for institutional change” (Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2010:25). In other words, subversives “work against the system from within 
it” (Idem:26, emphasis in original). In order to achieve their goals, subversives may 
encourage change by supporting the creation of new rules or subtly alter the way in 
which rules are implemented. As a result, subversives are associated with both 
layering and conversion. 
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The fourth and final category is opportunists. Mahoney and Thelen describe 
opportunists as having “ambiguous preferences about institutional continuity” 
(2010:27). Opportunists favor institutional arrangements that favor them, whether this 
means preserving old rules or supporting the creation of new ones. However, it should 
be noted that opportunists most often prefer to act within the existing system, and 
rarely favor radical change. Mahoney and Thelen point to the existence of 
opportunists as an explanation for institutional inertia, as well as why it is more 
difficult to change than to preserve the status quo (2010:26-27). As a result, 
opportunists emerge as actors that can both create and prevent change. However, in 
the instances that they contribute to change, opportunists are frequently associated 
with institutional conversion, where existing rules are manipulated to suit their 
interests. The institutional agents that exist and the type of change they are associated 
with are summarized in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Institutional Agents and Types of Institutional Change 
Type of Agent Type of Change 
Insurrectionaries Displacement 
Parasitic Symbionts 
Mutualistic Symbionts 
Drift 
Increased Robustness 
Subversives Layering and Conversion 
Opportunists Conversion 
Source: The author 
 
Finally, it is important to note that although there are agents seeking to change the 
system, one must also take into account the agents who seek to maintain it. The 
stability of institutions over time to some extent depends on the effort and 
mobilization of resources on behalf of actors actively seeking to maintain the 
institution (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:9). This can include agents that are reluctant to 
change institutions because they benefit from them, but other factors may also come 
into play. For instance, decision-makers often lack sufficient information about the 
issues they want to address, and as a consequence they are “generally reluctant to 
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make sweeping policy decisions that would dramatically transform institutions”, 
instead opting for only marginal changes (Campbell, 2004:33).  
 
In order to influence the processes taking place within institutions, actors can 
participate in a range of behaviors in an attempt to exercise power over other actors 
within the institutions, in order to influence policy or institutional outcomes. This can 
include behavior such as vetoing, enforcing institutional rules to suit their own 
interests, or exploiting ambiguities to create institutional outcomes in their favor 
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:9). Actors may also engage in behaviors such as non-
decision making. Non-decision making is a behavior in which an actor exercises 
power by consciously or unconsciously preventing certain issues from appearing on 
the agenda, and in doing so preventing other actors from bringing up or addressing 
issues that could be detrimental to his or her interests (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962:949). 
Determining Dominant Agents 
The goal of applying Mahoney and Thelen’s model to Tajikistan is to determine 
which agents dominate the process of change, in turn allowing us to understand what 
type of change is taking place and why. The agent that emerges as dominant is 
defined by the level of discretion in enforcing institutions and the relative strength of 
the veto power exercised by agents seeking to preserve the status quo. The 
relationship between these factors is described in figure 3 below.  
 
As can be seen in the figure, strong veto possibilities together with a low level of 
discretion in enforcing and interpreting rules, leads subversives to emerge as the 
dominant actor. Strong veto possibilities make successful change of rules unlikely 
while a low level of discretion makes it difficult for agents of change to change the 
interpretation of rules, making layering the most likely strategy of change. The 
application of this framework to Tajikistan allows us to shed some light on which 
agents seek to change pasture management institutions. Discussing the agents of 
change and how their influence is affected by the political and institutional 
environment, will enable us to understand which agents are dominant, and how this is 
likely to affect the decentralization process in Tajikistan. 
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Source: The author, adapted from Mahoney & Thelen 2010:19. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Research Design and Approach 
I engage in this research with an ambition to gain in-depth understanding of pasture 
management institutions in Tajikistan, as well as to produce research that contributes 
to the theoretical understanding of institutional change. Flyvberg states that “from 
both an understanding-oriented and an action-oriented perspective, it is often more 
important to clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences 
than to describe the symptoms of the problem and how often they occur” (2006:229).  
Approaching this issue through the lens of a qualitative case study enables me to 
explore the issue in the context of Tajikistan, while also allowing me to engage in a 
theoretical analysis (Bryman, 2012:57). 
 
Tajikistan is relevant to this study as an exemplifying case (Bryman, 2012:56). 
Although every case by definition is unique, it is also important to note that Tajikistan 
shares many characteristics with other developing countries struggling with natural 
resource management, including weak and/or developing institutions, governance 
issues, lack of financial resources, and low transparency. In this sense, Tajikistan is 
not a unique or extreme case, but rather provides a suitable backdrop for the study of 
how natural resource governance institutions develop and change.  
Subversives 
Layering 
Symbionts 
Drift 
Insurrectionaries 
Displacement 
Opportunists 
Conversion 
Low Level of  
Discretion 
High Level of  
Discretion 
Strong Veto 
Possibilities 
Weak Veto 
Possibilities 
Figure 3. Contextual Characteristics and Dominant Change Agents 
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4.2 Data Collection 
Case studies are often characterized by extensive data collection stemming from 
multiple sources of information (Creswell, 2012:75). The means of data collection 
include a desk review of relevant documents, in-field observations and interviews, 
each of which is further described below. Tajikistan has limited civil liberties and 
conducting research that is perceived as politically sensitive or threatening by 
government authorities is not free of risk
1
 (Freedom House, 2013). Given that the 
restrictive political environment in Tajikistan and the fact that this thesis discusses 
politically sensitive issues such as power and the distribution of resources, the data 
collection process required a great degree of caution and pragmatism.  For this 
reasons, all participants and organizations in the study will remain anonymous. Data 
collection took place in the period between December, 2014 and January, 2015, after 
a five month long presence in the country. The time spent living in the field prior 
allowed me to take an inductive approach to the research and increase my 
understanding of the Tajik context (Bryman, 2012:366). 
In-field Observations 
The in-field observations include notes from two conferences relating to pasture 
management in Tajikistan. The conferences were a concrete manifestation of the 
space where the ambiguities of implementation and enforcement are discussed and 
negotiated among institutional actors, were an important means of observing the 
institutional environment and the relationships between different actors in an 
unobtrusive and neutral manner.  
 
I attended the conferences as an observer, and did not directly participate in any of the 
discussions. My presence was facilitated by gatekeepers from international 
organizations, which were active within the field of pasture management. The first 
                                                 
1
 One notable incident includes the arrest of a PhD student accused of espionage 
while conducting research on behalf of the University of Toronto in Tajikistan in 
2014 (Rickleton, 2014). 
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conference was dedicated to discussing the general implementation of the new law on 
pastures while the second conference focused primarily on the establishment of 
Pasture User Associations (PUAs). Both conferences united a range of stakeholders 
within pasture management, including representatives from organizations, local and 
national governance structures (for more details see Appendix I). 
 
There is a general unwillingness to discuss politically sensitive issues such as 
institutional dynamics or power relations candidly. The choice to gather data as a 
neutral observer was a means of mitigating this issue, as face-to-face interviews could 
easily have been perceived by the participants as confrontational, or lead participants 
to consciously or unconsciously manipulate data in order to exemplify or diminish 
existing power dynamics. As such, the conferences were one of the most important 
sources of information and offered unique insights into the policy-making and 
implementation process and how different actors relate to each other.  
Interviews  
Interviews are described as “one of the most important sources of case study 
evidence” (Yin, 2003:110). A total number of 26 interviews were completed, of 
which two were interviews with key informants from international organizations 
working within the field of pasture management, and 24 were with livestock owners 
in rural areas (see Appendix II for list of respondents). The interviews were semi-
structured, and were centered around a few predetermined topics, each lasting for 
approximately 30 minutes. The key informant interviews were held in English and 
interviews with livestock owners were held in Tajik and facilitated by a translator. 
The questions were structured according to a flexible guide rather than a formal 
questionnaire (see Appendix III and IV for interview guides), with new questions 
sometimes being introduced during the course of the interview (Mikkelsen, 
2005:169). This approach created a more relaxed, informal environment, and kept 
interviews from becoming unnecessarily long while allowing me to adjust the 
questions to participants’ individual experiences. This became increasingly important 
as the data collection progressed and I realized that respondents’ knowledge and 
experiences of pasture management issues varied greatly depending on factors like 
village size, proximity to cities, the number of livestock owned and gender.  
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Desk Review of Relevant Documents 
According to Yin documents are an important means of corroborating information 
from other sources, and “play an explicit role in any data collection in doing case 
study research” (2003:107). The documents reviewed in this study include primary 
sources in the form of legal texts, and secondary sources in the form of academic 
articles and reports from NGOs. It is important to recognize that NGOs are not neutral 
actors, and that interpreting organization reports as neutral truths is problematic. 
Nonetheless, it has been necessary to use reports conducted by NGOs in order to gain 
up to date and relevant information given the limited literature available in English 
that specifically relates to pasture management in Tajikistan.  
4.3 Sampling Strategy 
In the selection of sites for in-field observations and interview participants a 
purposive sampling strategy was used in order to ensure that those interviewed were 
relevant to the research question at hand (Bryman, 2012:415). The sample of key 
informants included representatives from international organizations who have been 
working within the field of pasture management for a prolonged period of time, and 
who have in-depth knowledge both of the political context as well as practical issues 
related to implementation.  
 
Livestock owners were sampled in accordance with a maximum variation sampling 
strategy in order to get a more representative sample as well as to get an idea of how 
issues related to pasture management affected different types of livestock owners. The 
sampling strategy included interviewing livestock owners of both genders, as well as 
livestock owners with differing sizes of livestock herds, household sizes, sources of 
income, and geographic locations. Due to the political circumstances described above, 
I depended on gatekeepers for safe access to participants. This somewhat limited my 
ability to sample purposefully among livestock owners, as the choice of participants 
was sometimes left up to the gatekeepers’ discretion. However, I attempted to 
mitigate this issue and ensure a variety within the sample by clearly explaining my 
research purpose to gatekeepers, and citing key criterion for selection.  
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4.4 Analysis of Data, Reliability, and Validity  
Throughout the data collection process I relied on field notes to record interview 
participants’ responses as well as my observations from the field. Gatekeepers 
strongly discouraged audio recordings, stating that recordings done by anyone other 
than journalists or government officials were illegal, and that interview participants 
would fear their opinions being broadcasted in news or radio, which would 
significantly affect their responses. To generate trust between the participants and 
myself as well as to ensure the safety of everyone involved, all interviews were 
documented in note form.  
 
In order to maintain the reliability of field notes and interview data, I adhered to 
Spradley’s recommendation of taking short notes at the time and expanding them as 
soon as possible after each session (Spradley in Silverman, 2013:219). Notes from 
field sessions included notes about the atmosphere of the session, tone and body 
language of participants, as well as the content of the participants’ statements.   The 
resulting data was coded manually in several phases, and systematically arranged 
according to recurring themes and concepts present in the analytical model (Saldaña, 
2013:7-10).  
 
The thesis is based on several means of data collection, which has enabled me to 
observe different perspectives on the issue and use data triangulation to validate my 
findings (Yin, 2003:121). Throughout the data analysis, I strived to assess all 
information critically, with due regard to the context in which it was produced. The 
ability to triangulate data and findings was especially important given the complexity 
of the issue being studied and the sensitive political context, which is characterized by 
low levels of trust for government authorities and outsiders, as well as a general 
unwillingness to speak candidly about politically sensitive issues. Using multiple 
sources of data allowed me to cross check my findings, and ensures the validity of the 
study (Bryman, 2012:32).  
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4.5 Limitations and Ethics 
Collecting data in a sensitive political environment had several implications for this 
research. Certain precautions were required in order to protect interview participants, 
the translator as well as myself, which increased my dependency on gatekeepers and 
limited my ability to ask certain types of questions, particularly questions related to 
power asymmetries, corruption and other issues that could be seen as politically 
sensitive.  
 
These aspects of the political environment affected the process of gaining consent. 
The importance of gaining consent from research subjects, preferably through the 
signature of a consent form, is emphasized in academic literature (Silverman, 
2013:312; Creswell, 2012:134). However, asking interview participants to sign a 
formal document identifying them could easily be misunderstood, would have 
severely undermined their trust and compromised the information they were willing to 
share. For this reason I chose to ask for verbal consent, and began each interview with 
a clear explanation of the purpose of the study, and stating that participants were free 
to leave the interview at any time, or refuse to answer any questions they were 
uncomfortable with. I also guaranteed anonymity, in line with Creswell’s proposed 
consent form (2012:123). To further illustrate my commitment to maintaining the 
anonymity of participants I did not ask for names or any identifying details other than 
those directly relevant to the study. Nonetheless, in spite of efforts to create trust, it 
was clear that in some cases I was not perceived as a neutral actor, and was 
sometimes treated with a high degree of suspicion, which could have influenced their 
responses. This issue was somewhat mitigated by the gatekeepers, who were familiar 
with the participants and helped create a more relaxed environment. 
 
It is also important to note the fact that the legal framework for pasture management 
and its implementing institutions are large and complex, with many interrelating 
actors and power dynamics. My ability to partake in the conferences allowed me a 
degree of insight into a complex and elusive institutional process that would 
otherwise have been off limits. However, it is also important to recognize that the size 
of the sample is small, and that some aspects or agents affecting the institutional 
process may not have been immediately obvious in the specific conferences I 
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attended. Although a larger sample would have benefitted the study, this was not 
possible within the timeframe, given that conferences were relatively rare events. 
There may be additional elements of the decision-making process that took place 
outside of the forums I had access to, for instance in the form of personal 
conversations between institutional actors, private correspondence, or informal 
decision-making processes. I attempt to mitigate this issue with the use of multiple 
sources and the triangulation of data, but this remains a challenge within this subject 
of research.  
 
Furthermore, the data collection process took place during the winter. Due to weather 
conditions and lack of infrastructure, the geographical area of study was limited to 
regions relatively near the capital. This may somewhat skew the results, as the 
conditions and quantities of pastures vary greatly throughout the country, and the 
regions near the capital are generally more affluent and have access to a greater 
quantity of land. Finally, the language barrier was also a limitation to this study. 
Although key informants spoke English, the conferences attended as well as the 
interviews with villagers were held in Tajik with the help of a translator, which may 
have affected the reliability of the information. This was mitigated by consistently 
asking follow up questions and cross checking answers with respondents.  
5. Analysis 
 
In this section Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change is applied 
to documents, interviews and observations from the field. In the first section agents 
that are actively seeking to create change and decentralize pasture management and 
the means by which they are trying to do it are presented. This is followed by a 
discussion of the political and institutional context, and the role of institutional 
ambiguity. The chapter concludes with a discussion of which agents that emerge as 
dominant in the process of institutional change, and, in turn, what it means for the 
decentralization process in Tajikistan. 
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5.1 Agents of Change 
 
When describing the actors and the change occurring in the pasture management 
sector in Tajikistan, it is important to consider the national context. The creation of 
effective pasture management mechanisms is strongly linked with Tajikistan’s 
transition to a market-based economy and overall efforts to further decentralize the 
country. In the national development assistance framework, over-centralization, 
constrained and poorly developed local governance, and lack of accountability and 
transparency are identified as key obstacles for development (United Nations Country 
Team, 2009:17). Due to the lack of government resources to implement reforms, 
international organizations like the UNDP and the World Bank have a prominent role 
in funding and implementing projects that serve this purpose (United Nations Country 
Team, 2009). One of the most recent defining features of pasture institutions that 
unites agents from the government as well as international organizations is the new 
law on pastures. The basic principles of the law are presented in the section below. 
The New Law on Pastures 
The most concrete step towards the decentralization of pasture management can be 
seen in a new law on pastures passed in 2013 (Law on Pasture, 2013). Pastures in 
Tajikistan are the property of the state, and the rights to use pastures are allocated by 
the government, state agencies, district governments and local self-governing bodies, 
also known as jamoats (Wilkes, 2014:11). In theory the 2013 Pasture Law contributes 
to the decentralization of pasture governance by increasing accountability and the 
influence of local actors through the creation of three new pasture institutions: Pasture 
User Associations (PUAs), a Commission on Pastures (CoP), and a government 
pasture agency.  
 
The PUAs created by the new law are intended to be independent public bodies 
consisting of pasture users. User associations, also referred to as user committees and 
user groups, have been implemented extensively throughout the world, particularly in 
low income countries, and are common features of natural resource governance 
schemes and development programmes (Manor, 2004:6). They are seen as a means of 
bringing development initiatives closer to local levels, giving individuals at grass root 
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levels a sense of ownership, as well as giving them a greater degree of influence in 
policy processes and decision-making and enabling them to assert themselves (Manor, 
2004:194-195). In Tajikistan, the recognition of PUAs as legal entities will allow, for 
instance, whole villages or groups of households to jointly lease land from the state 
and participate in medium and long-term pasture planning. Other functions of the 
PUAs include capacity building, settling land disputes, and engaging in “effective use 
of pastures” (Wilkes, 2014: 11; Law on Pasture, 2013).  
 
The CoP, the second institution created by the new law, can be seen as another means 
of furthering decentralization by increasing accountability. The CoP should be 
established by the assembly of people’s representatives at a district level, and will 
include representatives from government bodies, local self-governing bodies, experts 
on land management as well as representatives of pasture users (Wilkes, 2014:11). In 
theory, the CoP has a wide range of functions, including regulating pasture use, 
settling land disputes, providing recommendations to support district governments in 
decision-making, and pasture management functions (Wilkes, 2014:11). Finally, the 
government pasture agency created by the law designates several key regulatory 
functions, including the development of standard norms and methods for pasture 
management, the monitoring of pasture use, as well as implementation of state pasture 
management programmes to an authorized government body.   
Agents of Change at Government Levels 
With this in mind, the government of Tajikistan can be considered one of the main 
actors driving current institutional change, for instance in the adherence to the above 
mentioned development strategy and in the drafting and approval of legislation for 
this purpose.  Nonetheless, it is also important to note that “the government” is in 
itself a large, complex structure that contains several different types of actors at 
national and local levels. At the national level, the drafting and passing of the new law 
on pastures indicates the presence of subversive agents seeking to create change in the 
form of layering. However, observations show that actors representing more local 
levels of governance, such as the district representatives, were more outspoken in 
their approach to change, with some acting as insurrectionaries openly speaking out 
against existing institutions, and others who seemed to resist change in general.  
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It is also important to account for the possibility that some agents within the 
government structure also seek to directly counteract rather than support the changes 
to the pasture legislation, by acting as opportunists or symbionts. In fact, Larson and 
Ribot argue that one of the reasons natural resources seem so difficult to decentralize 
is because of their value to both local livelihoods as well as ruling elites (2004:4). 
While decentralizing natural resource management is an opportunity to further 
include local populations and authorities in policy- and decision-making, it also often 
includes “a threat to local authorities and elites who fear a loss of income or patronage 
resources”, resulting in central government bodies and elites attempting to further 
control resources (Larson & Ribot, 2004:4). This is highly likely to be the case given 
that political power and control over economic resources in Tajikistan is concentrated 
among a limited number of ruling elites that control governmental and legal 
institutions (De Martino, 2004:8).  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that in addition to 
the agents directly observed within this study, there are also more covert actors and 
means in which power is exercised that may not always be visible.  
International Organizations as Agents of Change 
Through discussions with key informants as well as the conferences, it became clear 
that the most influential actors within the field of pasture management other than 
government and state institutions were international organizations and NGOs (Key 
informant 1, Conference 1). In addition to funding and implementing several 
programmes designed to improve pasture management, they were also instrumental in 
the drafting of the pasture law and are key implementing partners. There are currently 
at least seven ongoing internationally funded projects dedicated to improving pasture 
management, six of which directly seek to address institutional issues (Wilkes, 
2014:25-26). The financial contributions from international donors in this field are 
substantial – for instance the projects implemented by the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) have received over 30 million USD in funding 
(IFAD, n.d.).  
 
Although international organizations are openly critical of the current pasture 
management institutions, it is also clear that they seek to work with the government 
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and existing institutional structures rather than against them. Their presence in the 
country as well as their ability to do their work is directly dependent on the 
government sanctioning their activities and cooperation with government institutions. 
Thus, international actors are best understood as subversives – actors seeking to 
change the system from within, that do not seek to preserve current institutions, but 
who follow its rules (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:23). The creation of the new law on 
pastures and the emergence of spaces in which international organizations can work at 
village levels to support institutional development is a case of layering - in 
recognizing that it would be too costly and difficult to change existing institutions, the 
agents attempting to change the institutions have instead added new rules to the 
existing framework. It is worth noting that this is still a work in progress - several 
bylaws serving to clarify and further specify the new law on pastures and the 
institutions it created are currently in the process of being drafted, in what at least on 
the surface appears to be a promising development towards the decentralization of 
pasture management institutions. However, in order to judge the “degree and 
permanence” of the change being created it is necessary to look further into the 
political and institutional context.   
Absent Agents of Change 
Finally it is worth noting that one group of actors remain conspicuous in their absence 
– namely those who are arguably the most affected by the institutions, the pasture 
users themselves. Although they can be considered to be indirectly represented 
through government agents like district representatives, it is interesting to note that 
they do not emerge as actors in their own right. Furthermore, given the authoritarian 
and highly centralized system of government in Tajikistan the extent to which district 
representatives are truly representative can be called into doubt (De Martino, 2004).  
The absence of livestock owners as independent agents could stem from the sites of 
data collection – farmers and villagers are not invited to conferences with policy-
makers, and no livestock owners from villages in which a PUA had been established 
were interviewed.  Furthermore, in the villages visited, several participants expressed 
a lack of will or desire to work with livestock in the first place, stating that they did it 
due to lack of other choices (e.g. interviews 1, 3, 7, 9, 18). This in combination with 
the fact that the income in general is very low, together with a lack of 
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capacity/incomplete understanding of the benefits of pasture management seems to 
indicate that there are few motives for villagers to organize themselves and attempt to 
influence current policies. However, this is an area that would benefit from future 
research.   
5.2 Political and Institutional Context  
In the previous section it was made clear that there are actors within the field of 
pasture management that are actively seeking to change pasture management 
institutions and the way they work. However, in order to discuss to what extent agents 
seeking to create change are likely to be successful, it is necessary to consider the 
political and institutional context. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that two main 
characteristics affect which institutional actor that emerges as dominant, the first 
being whether defenders of the status quo have strong or weak veto possibilities, and 
the second being whether the institution allows actors to exercise a high or low degree 
of discretion in interpreting and enforcing institutional rules. This section discusses 
the political and institutional context based on observations from the conferences and 
interviews with livestock owners at a village level. 
Beyond Veto Power?  
Veto possibilities are considered to be high “where there exist actors who have access 
to institutional and extra institutional means of blocking change”, both through formal 
and informal means (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:19). If those seeking to preserve the 
status quo have weak veto possibilities displacement, the replacement of existing 
rules, to occur. However, in the event of high veto possibilities, layering is a more 
likely form of change. This section first discusses examples of how veto power was 
exercised by different agents, and then goes on to discuss the implications of this 
behavior.  
 
A notable example of this relates to the allocation of land, and the issuing of land use 
certificates. As explained previously, the new pasture law stipulates the creation of 
PUAs, which have the right to lease pastureland. The distribution of land is one of the 
main challenges for effective pasture management and the implementation of the new 
law. The issue was raised by livestock owners, during the conferences and by key 
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informants. Key informants identified two main issues relating to the distribution of 
land. Firstly, the overall distribution of land is uneven and was a remnant from the 
land management practices of the Soviet Era, and bears little relation to current 
agricultural practices and land needs (Key informant 2). Secondly, they emphasized 
the lack of transparency of the certificates used to allocate pastureland. In some cases 
vast amounts of land are delegated to specific individuals or collective dekhan farms, 
regardless of the number of livestock owned (Key Informant 1).  
 
The reluctance on behalf of government representatives to discuss the distribution of 
land was evident during the first conference. Some of the district representatives 
attending the conference overtly challenged the institutional status quo and the 
commitment of the government representatives present in relation to this topic. Their 
sentiments are best represented by the two quotes below: 
“We must think about the huge level of bureaucracy. It is not allowing 
municipalities to do their work, and there is no political will from your side to 
improve or help. You as heads of Hukumats
2
 must review all [land use] 
contracts and terminate the non-transparent ones. Give the land back to 
pasture users, you are violating their rights!” (Conference 1) 
 
“I am here as a pasture user […] we do not have the right to use some of the 
land in our community because it belongs to people who do not even live 
there. We need training. After one training I have understood the issues, and 
with training we will understand and organize ourselves. We HAVE land that 
we CAN’T USE, this is the truth! The district heads are the ones using it.” 
(Conference 1, capital letters used when participant was shouting). 
 
In this case, the district representatives attempting to raise the issue of land 
certificates seem to comply most closely with the actor type described by Mahoney 
and Thelen as insurrectionaries – actors that do not want to comply with the 
institution and that overtly seek to change it. If successful in their attempt to create 
institutional change, insurrectionaries are frequently associated with displacement – 
old rules are replaced in favor of new ones. However, during the conference it became 
very clear that this confrontational approach was not an effective way of influencing 
policy makers. In response to the confrontation, the government officials present did 
                                                 
2
 In this context hukumat refers to government administrative structures at district 
levels.  
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not address the any of the concerns raised by the district representatives, instead 
opting to discuss issues raised earlier by other participants. When prompted yet again 
about the issue, the parliament representative responded by aggressively asserting that 
those present at the conference were wrongly focusing on problems rather than 
solutions, and in his final statement before closing the conference again aggressively 
emphasized that those attending had failed to understand the law, which addressed all 
the concerns raised: 
“You who are here today did not read or understand this law. Please read and 
understand because the answers to all the questions you raised are specified 
there. How can we manage pastures if we ourselves do not know?” 
(Conference 1).   
 
This was a trend throughout the first pasture conference – agents who overtly 
challenged the existing system were consistently ignored. The refusal to candidly 
discuss the disproportionate allocation of pastureland echoes the fact that crucial legal 
issues remain undefined in the current legislation. This shows the ways in which 
government officials exercise their informal veto power through non-decision making 
to influence the type of institutional change. Because they refused to respond to the 
issue of land certificates, they effectively prevented it from becoming established on 
the agenda and from being discussed at any depth (Bacharach & Baratz, 1962). The 
second conference followed a similar pattern - the only national government 
participant, a representative from the Ministry of Agriculture, did not attend. This 
meant that although many issues relevant for implementation were discussed and the 
measures taken to proceed were agreed upon, the proposed solutions could not be 
verified or formally approved.  
 
As a result, the law has done little to change the distribution of pastureland to date, 
and one key informant emphasizes that the law was passed quickly, without due 
discussion of this crucial issue:  
“The distribution of pastures to citizens is not proper. Two years ago the 
pasture law was in a speed process, and some issues should have been 
discussed further to improve the law […] The distribution of pastures was 
wrong, and people working in the government receive 1000 hectares of 
pasture” (Key informant 2).  
 
 37 
The effect that the concentration of large quantities of land in the hands of a few 
private owners has on the functioning of the PUAs was poignantly illustrated in the 
statement a conference participant made when discussing the PUAs: 
“Regarding the structure of PUAs, it is easy to feel helpless. PUAs can’t do 
anything when resources are not allocated to them. The core is that they have 
no lands, and no land has been allocated to them. What is the structure for?” 
(Conference 2).  
 
The fact of the matter is that although the new law has made it possible for PUAs to 
lease land, there is very little land available for PUAs to lease.  
 
Several representatives from international organizations were also present at the 
conference where land certificates were discussed. International organizations support 
the notion of institutional change in the area of pastures - their very involvement is a 
strong indicator of the desire to change, not to mention the funding of programmes 
intended to improve pasture management institutions, as well as the fact that the 
conference was organized by the international organizations in the first place. 
However, the discussion (or lack thereof) relating to land certificates offered an 
interesting backdrop to get a more nuanced idea of how the organizations position 
themselves in relation to different actors. Although the international organizations are 
clearly in favor of the new law on pastures and it is in their interest to actively seek 
solutions to implementation problems, the representatives of the international 
organizations took no public stance on the issue of land certificates. In fact, no 
organization representative made any direct reference to land certificates at all, nor 
did they address the concerns raised by district representatives. Instead making 
general statements suggesting the need for improvement, but without venturing into 
openly supporting or criticizing any specific actor. In this sense, international 
organizations are not openly resisting the current institutional system, but instead 
complying with the role of subversives, phrasing the need for change in general terms 
without directly responding to those who were overtly challenging the institutional 
status quo, and working within the system to change the system. 
 
Relatively strong veto power also seems to permeate the institutional environment at a 
village level, which in turn could further affect how the laws are implemented in 
practice at local levels. For instance, when asked about the distribution of land to the 
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villages, one key informant, who comes from and lives in a village outside the capital, 
responded: 
“I don’t know why, but it was divided during Soviet times, and until now the 
same rules apply. Only livestock from our village can use it, other villages 
cannot. There were some issues about giving some of the saharob [village 
land] to other villages […] People from [a different] community wrote a letter 
to the jamoat to ask for more land for their livestock, but our community did 
not agree. Some land has already been taken from [Village A’s] land, they 
came from another village and took it.” (Interview 24) 
 
When asked how this was possible, the response was: “Because they have a strong 
leader in their community. Their leader was stronger than us, so they took it” 
(Interview 24). These examples show that there is a relatively high degree of both 
formal and informal veto power, and indicates that informal power structures can 
exist independently of formal institutions.  
 
As can be seen, there are several examples of agents exercising veto power to 
influence the trajectory of institutional change. Within the scope of this study, the 
most evident form of veto power was informal veto power. Throughout the data 
collection process, it became apparent that efforts to create change were frequently 
countered with informal efforts to prevent it. It is worth noting that this resistance to 
change was rarely overt, but seems to have more commonly manifested itself through 
non-decision making, or exploiting institutional ambiguities in order to create the 
desired institutional results. One of the most apparent ways in which agents appear to 
be exercising their veto power is by dominating the agenda, and refusing to engage in 
certain discussions. This was especially the case with government representatives, 
who simply refused to discuss certain issues that are crucial to the effective 
implementation of the law, in spite of the fact that these issues were recurrent in 
conferences. 
Discretion in Enforcing and Implementing Institutional Rules 
The second characteristic that can influence the relative power of actors seeking to 
create institutional change is the level of discretion in implementing and enforcing 
institutional rules – in other words, the extent to which those enforcing the rules have 
the power to act according to their own judgment. Change in the form of conversion 
and drift are less likely to occur in institutional environments that are rigid, with little 
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room for individual interpretation of rules. However, if the level of discretion is high, 
drift and conversion are more likely. In exploring this dimension of the institutional 
environment, the interviews with livestock owners offered a great degree of insight 
into the institutional environment and the agents shaping it at village levels. The 
institutional environment at local village levels is relevant because although the 
institutional framework is drafted at national levels, local authorities and the 
institutional environment in villages will have a significant effect on how the laws are 
implemented in practice.  
 
The level of discretion in the distribution of pastureland and the enforcement of rules 
exercised by those in positions of authority in the village became clear when 
comparing responses of respondents from different villages. For instance, when asked 
who decides which pastureland can be used and when in village A, respondents 
stated:  
“The Brigadier [village manager]. He divides the land and decides which is 
saharob. Everybody in the village knows which land they can use”  
(Interview 5). 
 
“If someone was breaking the rules or not taking care of their cows it is 
reported to the village manager. The manager will give him a warning the first 
time, and usually it doesn’t happen again” (Interview 2) 
 
These two responses exemplify the vast majority of the answers from village A. The 
respondents from this village stated that the village brigadier was in charge of the 
common land (saharob), that everyone in the village had the right to use it, and that no 
fees were required. However, in other villages the situation was very different. When 
asked about the regulations for using the saharob and whether he/she was familiar 
with any new laws about pastureland, a respondent from village F stated the 
following: 
“No, there are no new laws, but some leaders came. We have a very small 
saharob, and the leaders said that they own the saharob and that if we want to 
use it we must pay. Now we have a saharob, but it is not used. Chinese people 
are building a brick factory there.” (Interview 16) 
 
This shows that the implementation of legal and institutional frameworks related to 
the management of resources can vary greatly between different villages, and that 
there is a high level of discretion in enforcing institutional rules. This discretion in the 
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enforcement of rules also appears to apply to positions of power, and which person in 
the village is in charge. It is worth noting that throughout the village interviews, 
denominations of people in power were often vague and confusing, with informants 
often using imprecise terminology such as “the manager”, “the government people”, 
or “the leaders” without specifying in what capacity they visited the village or how 
they were related to local or government institutions (Interview 23, 16, 21, 22). This 
may partly have been due to translation issues, although in many cases it seemed as if 
the respondents were not sure themselves. For instance, most villagers referred to the 
Brigadier as the village manager, stating that he was in charge. However, others took 
care to distinguish between the two, referring to the village manager as “the big boss, 
above the brigadier, and he has more land and more cows” (Interview 21) and “a rich 
person with a lot of land” (Interview 22).  Thus, it appears that the figures with the 
authority to implement and enforce rules seem to vary greatly, while villagers have 
little insight into who is responsible for what.   
 
The high level of discretion present at multiple institutional levels has several 
implications for the process of institutional change. For example, it poses risks to the 
effective implementation of the new pasture laws. During the second conference, this 
became very clear, as the fear of different jamoats and village leaders interpreting the 
rules in order to centralize and manipulate financial resources was a recurring theme. 
Participant expressed a fear of PUAs being subject to taxes, and being used as 
scapegoats for government debts. This is best summarized in the following quotes 
from conference participants, which also illustrate the sense of helplessness many 
participants seemed to feel in the face of these issues: 
“Some dekhan farms have government debts, and are ready to give land 
certificates to PUAs in order to avoid paying those debts. If the PUUs become 
legal entities, all debts will be transferred to them. The whole process is tricky, 
and as new legal entities, PUAs will immediately get the attention from [local] 
tax authorities – everyone wants their share of the cake” (Conference 2). 
 
“If the PUA is registered with the jamoat, and the jamoat says ‘now you will 
pay taxes instead of dekhan farms’, what will we say to them?”  
(Conference 2) 
 
This appears to have already occurred in the case of one PUA, the head of which 
stated: 
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“Even without economic activity we must pay tax, and every month I must pay 
161 somoni
3
. But we have no land, and we have no economic activities or 
income, but the tax committee does not care” (Conference 2).  
 
This is clearly a problem in the establishment of PUAs, since it not only makes them 
vulnerable to manipulation by elites, but can also pose personal financial risks for 
those who establish them. With these examples in mind, it can be concluded that in 
addition to preservers of the status quo having a relatively high veto power, agents 
also exercise a high degree of discretion in interpreting and enforcing the rules. The 
data points to an underlying mechanism that enables these characteristics - 
institutional ambiguity.  
Institutional Ambiguity – Mechanism for Change or Manipulation?  
The data shows that veto power and discretion in the implementation of rules give rise 
to institutional ambiguity – but is that ambiguity a means of change or manipulation? 
Mahoney and Thelen argue that the creation of institutional ambiguity creates 
opportunities for change, as different actors can affect how rules are implemented and 
enforced. In theory, this could allow actors challenging the current status quo to have 
a significant impact on how the institution functions. However, when analyzing the 
data it became clear that institutional ambiguity was not a mechanism for change, but 
manipulation. It seems like agents seeking to counteract change exploit the ambiguity 
to interpret and enforce rules as a means of counteracting change.  
 
The most notable example of this can be found in the creation and implementation of 
the law on pastures, and the discrepancy between its theoretical application and its 
application in practice. For example, on paper, the pasture law appears to create a 
clear structure for pasture management. However, in practice, the institutional 
environment regarding pastures is extremely complex. Over five institutions are 
involved in the management of pastureland
4
 (Wilkes, 2014:9-10). While the law on 
                                                 
3 Approximately 25 USD on 18 May, 2015 (OANDA, 2015). 
4
 These include, but are not limited to the State Committee of Land, the State Land 
Inspection, the Ministry of Agriculture, the State Forestry Agency, the Ministry of 
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pastures creates three new institutional bodies to manage pastures, it does not clarify 
how or through which channels these bodies should fulfill the extensive duties 
ascribed to them, nor does it provide a clearer division of the responsibilities among 
the institutions that already exist. In this sense, the law does not address one of the 
most critical issues – the need to clarify the institutional environment. This 
exacerbates ambiguity and opens spaces for agents to counteract change. The extent 
of how this affects the implementation of the law became clear during the second 
pasture management conference. The aim of the conference was to unite different 
stakeholders, including legal experts, to discuss the practicalities of implementing.  
However, the majority of the conference was dedicated to discussing whether PUAs 
were a legal group in the first place (Conference 2). This is a strong indicator of the 
uncertainty agents seeking to create change face, and how it can stall their efforts. 
 
Furthermore, not only does the new law fail to decrease the existing ambiguity, it 
appears to add to it. For instance, although implementation, regulation and 
enforcement of the law are delegated to a government pasture agency, such an agency 
currently remains to be established (Wilkes, 2014:12). The law also fails to define key 
aspects of how the PUAs will work, most notably the legal procedure for registering 
them and the duties that they are expected to fulfill. For example, the law on pastures 
states that “Pasture user associations should apply to the appropriate government 
body” (Law on Pasture, 2013:Article 7). However, which government body is 
appropriate is not specified. This, in turn, creates spaces where different agents can 
exercise informal veto power or manipulate the interpretation and enforcement of 
rules to their advantage, as could be seen for instance in the allocation of resources to 
PUAs, or the fear of PUAs being overly taxed by local authorities. One key informant 
describes the situation as an “institutional disaster”, stating that institutions refuse to 
cooperate with each other (Key Informant 1). This also significantly complicates the 
establishment and activities of PUAs, which must interact with several institutions in 
order to be legally established and to receive approval for activities. The key 
informant states that, “institutions bounce PUAs back and forth like balls, each not 
                                                                                                                                           
Land and Water Reclamation, district governments, jamoats, primary and secondary 
land users (Wilkes, 2014:9-10). 
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wanting to do the work or take responsibility” (Key Informant 1). Although PUAs are 
accepted as legal entities, the rules for establishing and running PUAs are not clear. 
This provides opportunities for local authorities and elites to exercise veto power and 
interpret the few rules that exist in their favor – resulting in the impact of the new law 
on pastures being severely limited. In practice, this means that institutional ambiguity 
prevents the new legal framework from being fully implemented, and negatively 
affecting the decentralization process.  
From Ambiguity to Decentralization? 
The high level of institutional ambiguity has implications for the decentralization 
process. In addition to problems with registering PUAs, their unclear legal status 
limits their function as independent, decentralized units. Previous studies have 
emphasized the importance of downward accountability in ensuring effective 
decentralization through the use of user committees (Manor, 2004). The 
administrative structure of PUAs and their position in relation to other institutions is 
key to their success. According to key informants, generating trust among pasture 
users and convincing them that the money they invest PUAs will be used for relevant 
purposes is crucial:  
“The success of the PUAs is very related to the level of centralization – if they 
remain decentralized and the voluntary fees are used by the PUU themselves 
and they can see what work is being done it will work. But if higher levels of 
the government ask them to put it in a central fund or something like that, and 
it becomes more centralized, it will not work” (Key Informant 1). 
 
A large extent of the legal framework specifying how the new law on pastures will be 
implemented remains undefined. Tt is not clear which, if any, institutions the PUAs 
will be accountable to, nor is it clear whether PUAs are upwardly accountable to any 
ministries or community structures like jamoats. However, several participants in the 
conference expressed fears that PUAs would be made upwardly accountable, leading 
to increased government controls. Furthermore, the fact that the authority the 
government agency in charge of pastures has not yet been defined opens the 
possibility for layering in the form of new laws or bylaws being passed that establish 
it as a central, controlling actor. 
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This development would be in line with Manor’s findings that central government 
officials “establish user committees at the insistence of donors but then manipulate 
them to their own ends by limiting their downward accountability – through the 
selection of committee members – and by reigning in their powers and jurisdiction” 
(Larson & Ribot 2004:15).  
 
The ambiguity also exacerbates the risk of elite capture. Since the government pasture 
agency and responsibilities of the Commission on Pastures (CoP) has not yet been 
established, the full extent of their responsibilities and authority remain somewhat 
unclear. However, it is reported that revenue from PUAs could be used to cover the 
operational expenses of the CoP.  
 
Other legal aspects also pose threats to the effective decentralization of pastures. The 
CoP itself represents another area of concern. It has an extremely wide range of 
activities, including management and monitoring functions, and it is not clear how 
these will be implemented in practice. Although in theory the CoP should report to 
district councils, donors already express concern that district governments will treat it 
as an implementing agency by dominating its activities, which would severely limit 
its role as a representative platform (Wilkes, 2014:12).  
 
In addition to this, the unclear legal status of pastureland, and the fact that the land is 
officially owned by the government compounds this issue, by limiting the resources 
available to PUAs. One key informant comments on the allocation of land to PUAs: 
“There are private lands that are untouchable, which can only be allocated to PUU 
by presidential decree. But this will never happen since they were made private by 
presidential decree in the first place” (Key Informant 1).  In other words, in practice 
the function of PUAs is directly dependent on the cooperation of ruling elites. At the 
same time, the results of this research indicate that the commitment of these elites to 
decentralization remains questionable. 
 
Nonetheless, there are indications that some agents seem invested in decentralization 
reforms. The fact that the conferences were held at all points to some willingness to 
resolve these ambiguities, which can be considered a step forward in itself. It also 
points to the influence of international organizations, which organized them. At the 
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same time, the fact that the initiative to organize the conferences in order to resolve 
issues related to implementation was taken on behalf of international organizations 
rather than the government itself can also be seen as an indicator of government 
commitment to this reform. Furthermore, although the conferences were an important 
step forward, they were also limited when government representatives exercised 
informal veto power. The fact remains that ambiguity creates conditions where 
imposing controls or claims on funding from above in the form of layering or 
conversion are a very clear possibility. 
5.3 A Dominant Agent Emerges? 
 
It is clear that there are agents attempting to drive institutional change that exist 
simultaneously with forces trying to preserve the institutional status quo, seeking to 
prevent change. With this in mind, what is the likelihood that the current institutions 
in place for governing pastures evolve into more decentralized structures, and that the 
new law on pastures has the effect desired by donors? The previous sections have 
shown that agents within the system exercise a relatively high degree of veto 
possibilities, while there is also a high level of discretion in enforcing the rules. As 
can be seen in figure 4, this suggests that the type of agent most likely to emerge as 
dominant is parasitic symbionts. Parasitic symbionts are agents that exploit 
institutions for private gain, and are generally associated with institutional change in 
the form of drift.  
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Figure 4. A Dominant Agent Emerges 
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Source: The author, adapted from Mahoney & Thelen 2010:19. 
 
The high level of discretion in interpreting and enforcing institutional rules as a result 
of the ambiguity present in the current legislation provides multiple opportunities for 
agents within the institutional system to manipulate it in their favor.  Although no 
actors were directly observed acting as parasitic symbionts, this is hardly surprising 
given that this behavior is likely to be covert. Due to the complexity of the 
institutional system surrounding pastures, and the multitude of agencies that are 
involved in their implementation, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly where parasitic 
symbionts may emerge, making it all the more difficult to address. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that they can be present at both local and national levels. 
Some of the areas particularly vulnerable to the entrance of parasitic symbionts 
indicated in this analysis include the distribution of land certificates, which lacks 
transparency, and local tax authorities, which seem to seek means of increasing profit 
by taxing PUAs. However, parasitic symbionts could also be active on smaller and 
less noticeable scales. For instance, during the conference a 10-step process for 
registering PUAs was presented, in which the approximate cost of the required legal 
documents was outlined. However, the cost of different documents varied greatly 
between different regions, with one conference participant reporting that he paid 350 
somoni for a legal document estimated to cost 80 somoni
5
 (Conference 2). This 
indicates that the current institutional environment is vulnerable to manipulation and 
elite capture even at local levels. The potential consequences of this finding are 
illustrated by the fact that institutional drift in favor of old elites appears to be 
occurring at the expense of rural households, particularly with regard to the 
distribution of pastureland.  
 
This result also leads to the question of whether the refusal to discuss certain issues, 
especially the distribution of pastureland, is truly only about veto power? The 
reluctance to discuss land distribution is not simply a case of government agents 
exercising their power, but rather that it points to a form of institutional change – 
                                                 
5 350 somoni and 80 somoni correspond to values of approximately 55 USD and 12 
USD, respectively on May 18, 2015 (OANDA, 2015). 
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drift. External circumstances, like the distribution and ownership of livestock, and the 
structure of the agricultural sector, with households rather than collective dekhan 
farms as the dominant unit of production, have changed drastically. Yet, the 
institutional framework and allocation of resources remains extremely similar to the 
Soviet era. In fact, two thirds of all pastures in Tajikistan remain allocated to dekhan 
farms, while the remaining third is under the control of agricultural enterprises. This, 
in spite of the fact that cooperative farms account for less than 3% of the national 
value of livestock production (Lerman, 2012:174). The failure to adjust the 
distribution of land to the changing external circumstances is a case of institutional 
drift, which has interesting implications. In his study of agrarian reform in Tajikistan, 
Rowe concludes that “[l]ike the government itself, the presidents and directors of the 
farm laborers’ cooperatives, in most cases, are the same men and women who were in 
these posts under the Soviet regime, and have carried over into the new system” 
(2010:191). The distribution of resources continues to favor, and is likely to some 
extent still controlled by, an old system of elites. This could explain the reluctance of 
some institutional agents to critically assess or discuss this issue. Addressing the 
mismatch of resources could even constitute a direct threat to the income or political 
support of those controlling the institutions. In sum, the decentralization of pasture 
governance and the redistribution of pastureland through PUAs are taking place in the 
form of layering, albeit on a small scale. However, it is being directly counteracted by 
institutional of drift.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that the creation of the new law on pastures has 
created ambiguity in the interpretation and enforcement of the law, and thus opened a 
space in which different actors have the possibility to influence the decentralization 
process.  Considering that the new law on pastures was passed fairly recently, it 
remains too early to state conclusively what effect it has had or will have on pasture 
management in Tajikistan. However, the analysis clearly shows that there are many 
obstacles to overcome in order for the legislation to be implemented successfully. One 
of them is the ambiguity present throughout the phrasing and implementation of the 
institutional framework at both national and local levels. Agents that seek to prevent 
change are exploiting the leeway created by the ambiguity to a greater extent than 
those who seek to create it.  
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This ambiguity that exists not just in the procedure to establish PUAs, but also in their 
structure and their internal organization also opens the doors for manipulating the 
PUAs in favor of local authorities or elites, or excluding certain groups both avertedly 
and inadvertently. For instance, during one of the conferences a participant proposed 
imposing a rule that only households with more than 5 livestock should be allowed to 
register. However, this type of rule would severely limit the scope of the PUA as the 
majority of households have very small livestock herds, often no more than two or 
three animals. Furthermore, the procedures by which chairmen and secretaries will be 
appointed have not been specified, which opens doors for regulations to be imposed 
from above.  
 
This calls the efforts of agents seeking change, particularly international 
organizations, into question. In addition to veto power and the level of discretion in 
enforcing the rules, Mahoney and Thelen also stress that how agents interact with 
other institutions and which coalitions they align themselves in may also influence 
which actor emerges as dominant. With large NGOs acting as subversives and 
publically aligning themselves with the government while outright opposition is all 
but completely ignored, there is little support for those opposing the system. At the 
same time there is an abundance of opportunities to for those who benefit from the 
system to hinder the change within the institutions, making the type of change desired 
by subversives or insurrectionaries unlikely.  
 
However, this does not mean that international organizations have no means of 
influencing the trajectory of institutional change. The high level of discretion in 
enforcing institutional rules, as well as the ambiguities in the legislation, are indeed 
creating spaces for dialogue and debate between different actors, which in itself could 
be seen as an improvement. Furthermore, although it may be difficult to influence 
institutions at a national level, the high level of discretion exercised by local 
governing bodies that makes enforcement of the legislation difficult may also provide 
opportunities for NGOs to exert a more significant degree of influence on institutional 
change in villages. 
 
 Nonetheless, in spite of these possibilities, this is only likely to occur where 
international organizations have a strong enough presence over a consistent amount of 
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time in order to influence village-level institutions in a long-term lasting manner. In 
areas where NGOs are not present, there seems to be a high likelihood of jamoats and 
village authorities are only likely to comply with the law to its utmost extent if it is 
directly in line with their interests, or if it at least does not directly contradict them. 
This is similar to Andersson and Ostrom’s finding that “only local politicians who 
face positive incentives are likely to respond to decentralization reforms by making 
the required investments” (2008:81).  The fact remains that the institutional 
ambiguities remain so many that even if there are no actors directly counteracting 
change at local levels, enforcing the legislation remains a significant challenge.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
This study has discussed how different agents shape institutional change in Tajikistan, 
and ultimately how it is affecting the process of decentralization within pasture 
management institutions. An analysis of data in the form of field notes, interviews 
with key informants and livestock owners and a desk review of pasture management 
legislation reveals that although there are agents actively seeking to create change, 
notably international organizations and parts of the government itself, there are also 
agents that seem to seek ways to contradict it. A combination of strong formal and 
informal veto power and a high level of discretion in the implementation and 
enforcement of institutional rules make it difficult for subversives and 
insurrectionaries to create real change, particularly at local levels. Furthermore, the 
current institutional environment surrounding pasture management institutions is 
characterized by a high degree of institutional ambiguity, which rather than allowing 
agents seeking to create change in the form of decentralization, increases the 
opportunities for actors seeking to preserve the status quo and agents acting as 
parasitic symbionts to exploit ambiguities to their benefit, contributing to institutional 
drift. This makes the effective decentralization of pasture management institutions in 
Tajikistan unlikely, and increases the risk of elite capture.  
 
Apart from giving some insight into how the decentralization process in Tajikistan is 
affected by the institutional environment, these findings have interesting implications 
for international organizations, which are prominent both as agents seeking to create 
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change as well as donors. Firstly, it implies that much of the funding put toward 
institutional development and change appears to be producing only cosmetic changes. 
Secondly, within this context international organizations are acting as subversives, 
seeking to change the system without outright opposing it or challenging the ruling 
elites.  
 
Rowe, in line with Meynen and Doornbos, also suggests that pressure from 
international organizations to decentralize and privatize, for instance in order to get 
loans, may complicate transition processes (2010:192). Countries like Tajikistan with 
limited economic resources may not have the institutional or economic capacity to 
implement effective reforms, instead opting for largely cosmetic changes in order to 
secure international approval (Rowe, 2010; Meynen & Doornbos, 2004). This is in 
line with an observation made by Nakata, who during her research of the peace 
building process after the conflict in Tajikistan observed that international aid in the 
early years after the war not only lacked transparency, but that the focus on 
liberalization and policy reform rather than long-term peace building created 
opportunities for ruling elites to legalize their ownership of strategic assets while 
further excluding opposing parties and actors (Nakaya, 2009:263). With this in mind, 
it is worth considering whether international organizations to some extent are 
enabling the manipulation of a weak institutional system, partly by providing funding, 
but also by complying to the unwritten rule that certain issues, such as the allocation 
of pasture land, are not up for discussion - in turn extending a degree of legitimacy to 
processes that are ultimately vague and which lack transparency.   
 
It is also important to recognize that although the use of Mahoney and Thelen’s model 
has provided insight into some of the factors affecting institutional change in 
Tajikistan, this does not mean that all the factors were captured in this study. It is 
likely that there are complexities within the institutional environment as well as 
agents within the institutional system at both national and local levels that this study 
did not detect. For instance, the power dynamics within villages and between villages 
and national government authorities in Tajikistan is an area that would benefit from 
further research, as would a more thorough study of the informal power mechanisms 
within government institutions. Furthermore, the long-term impact of recent 
legislation and reforms remain uncertain, and future studies of their direct impact at 
 51 
village levels, as well as how they are seen by livestock owners, dekhan farms and 
PUAs could yield interesting results.  
 
Nonetheless, the question remains whether this small, mountainous and landlocked 
country will be able to disrupt the cycle of land overuse and poverty that is 
threatening its development. Rural households in Tajikistan face an uncertain future if 
pasture quality continues to decline. Will livestock owners emerge as agents of 
institutional change in their own right, or will the degradation of pastures continue to 
go unchecked? Perhaps Verbugge is correct in stating that “[t]he most important 
effects of decentralization may not necessarily lie in its sudden impact on institutional 
arrangements, but in the creation of long-term institutional ambiguity, which carries 
the seeds of incremental institutional change” (2015:251). Let us only hope that it is 
change in a sustainable direction.  
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Appendix I: Record of Conferences 
Nr.  Date Name Characteristics 
1 2014-12-
02 
Round-Table 
Discussion of 
Pasture Laws 
Approximately 60 participants, 
including district representatives, 
representatives from the ministry of 
agriculture, a representative from 
parliament, and representatives from 
international organizations. The 
discussion was chaired by the 
representative of parliament. The 
conference was held in Tajik, and 
the overall mood was lively with 
some discussions turning heated. 
 
2 2014-12-
19 
Pasture Network 
Conference 
Approximately 20 participants, 
including representatives from 
NGOs, international organizations, 
technical experts and a few district 
representatives. A representative 
from the Ministry of Agriculture was 
invited but did not attend. The 
conference was described as a 
platform for sharing ideas. 
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Appendix II: Record of Respondents 
Key Informant Interviews 
Nr. Date Gender Field of Work 
1 2014-12-20 Female Pasture Management Advisor 
2 2015-01-16 Male Agronomic Specialist, previously in 
charge of implementing a pasture 
management project 
 
Livestock Owner Interviews 
Nr.  Date Gender Village Number of Livestock 
1 2014-12-20 Female Village A 3 cattle 
2 2014-12-20 Female Village A 5 cattle, 4 goats, 12 sheep 
3 2014-12-20 Male Village A 3 cattle 
4 2014-12-20 Male Village A 10 cattle, 30 sheep 
5 2014-12-27 Male Village A 16 cattle 
6 2014-12-27 Male  4 cattle 
7 2014-12-27 Female Village A 8 cattle, 14 goats, 20 sheep 
8 2014-12-27 Female Village A 8 cattle, 10 sheep, 10 goats 
9 2014-12-27 Male Village A 8 cattle 
10  2014-12-27 Male Village B 3 cattle 
11 2014-12-27 Female Village C 2 cattle 
12 2014-12-28 Female Village D 11 cattle, 2 sheep, 3 goats 
13 2014-12-28 Male Village A 5 cattle, 10 goats, 10 sheep 
14 2014-12-28 Male Village A 3 cattle 
15 2014-12-28 Male Village E 4 cattle, 40 sheep 
16 2014-12-28 Female Village F 3 cattle, 2 sheep 
17 2014-12-28 Male Village G 3 cattle 
18 2015-01-05 Male Village H 18 cattle, 100 sheep, 50 goats, 
12 horses 
19 2015-01-05 Female Village I 1 cattle, 3 sheep, 3 goats 
20 2015-01-08 Male Village J 28 cattle 
21 2015-01-08 Female Village K 2 cattle 
22 2015-01-08 Female Village L 2 cattle, 2 sheep 
23 2015-01-08 Female Village M 3 cattle 
24 2015-01-08 Male Village A 4 cattle 
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Appendix III: Interview Guide, Key Informants 
Interview Protocol: 
 Explain purpose of the study 
 Explain how the data will be used 
 Explain structure of interview 
 Ask for consent and approval from respondent to record written notes 
 Express that the respondent is free to leave any time 
 Express that the respondent may refrain from answering any questions 
 Guarantee anonymity of respondent 
 
Guiding questions and talking points:  
1) Can you tell me more about what you do, what you work with? 
2) Can you briefly explain how pasture management works in Tajikistan?  
3) How does it work at village levels?  
4) How much influence do local, “village-level” organizations have formally and 
in practice? 
5) Which are the key decision-makers/actors involved?  
6) What do you think the main challenges for livestock owners are in the future?  
7) How would you describe the relationship between the government and pasture 
users?  
- Thank the respondent for taking the time - 
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Appendix IV: Interview Guide, Livestock Owners 
Interview Protocol: 
 Explain purpose of the study 
 Explain how the data will be used 
 Explain structure of interview 
 Ask for consent and approval from respondent to record written notes 
 Express that the respondent is free to leave any time 
 Express that the respondent may refrain from answering any questions 
 Guarantee anonymity of respondent 
 
Guiding questions and talking points:  
General Information 
1. How many people live in your household? 
2. What is your main source of income?  
3. What are your main expenditures? 
 
Livestock Inventory 
4. Which types of livestock/animals do you keep and how many?  
5. How do they contribute to your household (e.g. income, food)? 
6. Who in the household is mainly responsible for the keeping and well-being of 
livestock?  
 
Pasture Use 
7. Can you briefly describe how you care for your animals? 
8. Approximately how many ha of pasture do you use/have access to? 
a. In the summer? Winter? 
b. Is the amount of pasture land you can use stable from year to year? 
9. Which type of land is it? (e.g. common land, own land, rented land) 
10. Do you pay for the use of pasture land (e.g. taxes, rent fees)? 
a. How much/about what percentage of your income? 
11. Are there enough pastures/feed for your livestock? How about for the town in 
general? 
12. Have you ever struggled to find enough hay/fodder/grass to feed your 
livestock? How did you deal with this? 
13. Have you ever cooperated with other livestock owners in the community to 
herd animals together, or share the pasture land? What were your reasons for 
doing this? 
 
Pasture Management 
14. Who/what decides which pastures you can use and when?  
a. How is the decision made?  
15. If someone has a problem with their pasture land, or the amount of pasture 
they can use, who do they discuss it with?  
16. Are there any groups or organizations in the community that discuss the use of 
pastures/keeping of livestock where pasture users are members? 
17. How do you distinguish between “your” pasture land and others’ pastureland? 
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a. Would you say these boundaries are clear? 
18. Are there any rules about using pasture land in the community (e.g. the 
number of animals per hectare, times of the year pastures may be used, certain 
boundaries etc.)? 
a. What happens if someone breaks one of these rules? Some more 
serious than others? 
19. Are you aware of any new laws relating to pastures and pasture use? 
a. If so, how do they affect you? 
20. Have there been any conflicts in the community related to the use of pastures, 
division of animals?  
a. If so, how were they resolved? 
 
Infrastructure  
21. Do you use any vaccines or other medicines to treat your animals on a regular 
basis? 
a. Are these services provided by the government, or privately? 
22. Is there any government support for people who lose their animals, e.g. due to 
cold weather, disease, etc.? 
23. Do you do anything to maintain the pastures you use, e.g. plant more grass, 
build fences, etc.? 
24. Do your animals stay in one place throughout the year, or do you use different 
pastures? 
25. Have you ever used a pasture more than a days travel from the home, or a 
pasture in a different district? Why did you/did you not decide to do this? 
a. Is this something you would have liked to do if you had the 
opportunity? 
b. Why or why not? 
c. If so, were any veterinary controls necessary? 
 
Future Plans 
26. Do you think keeping livestock is a good occupation? Why or why not? 
27. What is the most difficult thing with being a livestock owner?  
28. For how long do you think you can use these pastures? 
29. How do you think that your income/benefits from livestock could improve 
(e.g. more animals, access to markets)? 
30. What do you think your life will look like in 5 years? 10 years? 
31. What would you like to achieve in the next 5-10 years? 
32. Do you feel confident about your future? 
 
 
- Thank the respondent for taking the time - 
 
 
 
